Bangladesh Liberation War Exposed A Neocolonial State’s Failure

With flawed political process, mismanagement of contradictions in body-society-polity, failures in political arrangement, incapability in handling of aspirations ingrained within the society, limitations in socio-political farsightedness of the dominating part of the society and failures in making compromises with emerging reality the dominating elites in pre-1971-Pakistan exposed its historical limits in its domain. It was a failure of the neocolonial state as well as of the imperialist power that stood by it as its guarantor and savior. The Bangladesh people’s War for Liberation in 1971 exposed the failure, a significant development in the people’s stride onward.

Pakistan, the moth-eaten country as was reportedly described by its leader M A Jinnah, was always in a precarious position since it was organized in 1947. “Pakistan has never been a country where the institutions might be stronger than personalities. The country has generally done well under authoritarian rule”. (British Ambassador in Islamabad to Secretary of State Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1973, Diplomatic Report No. 392/73, August 16, FCO 37/1334, The National Archives, London, cited in Mahboob Hussain, Assistant Professor, Department of History and Pakistan Studies, University of the Punjab, Lahore, “Parliament in Pakistan 1971-77 and Chief Executive: An Analysis of Institutional Autonomy”, Journal of Political Studies, vol. 20, Issue - 1, 2013)

The state’s deep rooted problem is evident in the following finding and the question:

“Pakistan has been in existence for more than four decades, yet has still not […] resolved the question of its nationhood. Does Pakistan’s national identity depend on Islam, the common faith of the majority of its citizens? [….] The country’s foreign policy files contain evidence of a seemingly unending debate about the nature of Pakistan state.” (Mehtab Ali Shah, The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy, 1971-1994, I B Tauris, London, New York, 1997) Mehtab Ali Shah cites “the contradiction that exists between the country’s official status as an ‘Islamic’ nation state, on the one hand, and the reality of its existence as a multi-ethnic society […] on the other.” (ibid.)

The state dived into more perilous position in 1971. Quoting Robert LaPorte’s “Pakistan in 1971: The Disintegration of a Nation” (Asian Survey, vol. 12, no.2, February, 1972) and other Syeda Sara Abbas writes: “Pakistan was a country without a viable government, money, international policy or a constitution […] (“Deliberative Oratory in the Darkest Hour: Style Analysis of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Statement at the Security Council”, Pakistaniaat: A Journal of Pakistan Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2011) The state “survived” on “fatal links”, and the “fatal links” or the “linkages of failure” are told by Tariq Ali in his Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State (1983) and by Ayesha Jalal in her The State of Martial Rule (1991). Both of them cite linkage to, among others, the US imperialism. Like a business organization, the state at least once, had a CEO – Chief Executive Officer, a show of the state of the state’s nefarious political arrangement and compulsion, which many of the state’s 1971-mainstream politicians failed to perceive, which itself was a weakness in its system of observation, analysis and theory related to politics, especially the state.

The last act began on March 25, 1971, and the act concluded on December 16, 1971, the day Bangladesh people formally achieved victory by waging an armed struggle. A retired brigadier writes:

“On March 25, 1971, Gen Yahya Khan ordered the army to restore the writ of the state in East Pakistan [today’s independent Bangladesh]. On Dec 16, 1971, East Pakistan was no more.

“That afternoon [of December 16, 1971] in Dhaka, the Pakistan Army lost its honour […] when Lt Gen A.A.K. Niazi (Tiger) and his Eastern Command surrendered […] — honour that can be regained only on the battlefield. Until then, the ignominious defeat will continue to haunt the armed forces and succeeding generations in Pakistan.

“After he [Yahya Khan] chose to solve a political problem by military means [….] East Pakistan, as it stood on Dec 3, 1971, was ready to fall like a ripe plum.” (Dawn, December 3, 2009, “Blunders of the 1971 war”)

The military officer admits: “[T]he people there [in erstwhile East Pakistan, today’s independent Bangladesh] had risen in rebellion against the Pakistani state.” (ibid.)

“In 1971 Pakistan suffered a near death experience: genocide, civil war, migration and territorial reconfiguration.” (Syeda Sara Abbas, op. cit.) US Senator Fred R Harris cited a March 31, 1971 datelined report from The New York Times while urging the US government to “immediately end all military and economic assistance to Pakistan” in his letter to William P Rogers, the US secretary of state: “Pakistani soldiers have been dragging political leaders in East Pakistan into the streets where they are summarily shot. […E]xecution squads led by informers are systematically tracking down and killing East Pakistani intellectual leaders so that the people of that region will forever remain without a voice.” (US Senate, Committee on Government Operations, April 1, 1971) Congress member Halpern said in his statement: “thousands of people are being killed”. (Congressional Record House, “The need to clarify the Pakistani situation”, April 7, 1971, H 2524) US Senators Walter F Mondale, Edward W Brook, Mark O Hatfield and Edmund S Muskie in their letter to William P Rogers mentioned “bloodshed in East Pakistan” and “indiscriminate killing of unarmed civilians”. Senator Kennedy’s comments in early-April are much known: “It is a story of indiscriminate killing, the execution of dissident political leaders and students, and thousands of civilians suffering and dying every hour. It is a story of dislocation and loss of home. It is a story of little food and water.” With the situation the Pakistan state created in Bangladesh since March 1971 the state was engaged in its last act of delegitimizing itself as it was conducting genocide in a part of the country while waging a war against the majority of the population under its control as the majority of the people yearned for justice and equity.

The state found no tools and mechanism for controlling and cowing down the majority of the population other than carrying on the genocide, which was a stark show of the state’s limits in the capacity to rule. The state of business in 1971 in the Pakistan-statecraft was an example of a neocolonial state’s failure; and the genocide and the war against the people was no exception in the imperialist-neocolonial system. The genocide took away the state’s all claims to rule, and denuded its barbaric character. The war the state was waging against the majority of the population under its dominance “was intricate in nature as it involved gross human rights violations [….The] murder, rape and arson were severe enough to deem it an international crisis. (Syeda Sara Abbas, op. cit.) Ishaan Tahroor referred Sydney Schanberg, an eye witness and reporter, who termed it a pogrom, and cited the rape of 400,000. (Tharoor, “Keeping Dhaka’s Ghosts Alive”, Time, September 24, 2008)

Failure of the Pakistan state began since it was organized. “Political and economic mishandling of the East Pakistan by the former West Pakistan caused deep dissatisfaction and growth of nationalist feeling among the almost entirely Bengali population, regarded as inferior by most of West Wing’s Punjabis who were the majority of administrators. […] Unrest in the East was suppressed in a brutal pogrom by the army”. (Brian Cloughley, War, Coups and Terror, Pakistan’s army in years of turmoil, Pen & Sword Military, Pen & Sword Books Limited, South Yorkshire, Great Britain, 2008) Taha Siddiqui refers to a retired major of the Pakistan army, who fought in East Pakistan in 1971. The army officer “claims the cracks in the system had started to show long before 1971” (The Express Tribune, December 16, 1971, “Remembering 1971: A retired major tells the story he’d rather forget”) “The retired major, who is a third generation military officer, says that when he was young, he used to visit his father who was also posted in Chittagong, Bangladesh. ‘The civil service, military and other high ranking government positions were all occupied by West Pakistanis, who considered Bengalis an inferior race,’ he says. Many times he saw Bengalis openly humiliated and treated like ‘untouchables’.” (ibid.)

The failure culminated in 1971 while the Baangaalee people rose in revolt against injustice, deprivation, killing, violation of honor of its women, arson and loot.

Political crisis that the state was nourishing within its head began taking acute shape since the overthrow of dictator Ayub Khan in a mass upsurge that reached its peak in 1969. A general election based on universal adult franchise was held in the later part of 1970. The days going to the election and the election results signaled the forthcoming conflict, and failure of a faction of the dominating elites of the state and success of the Baangaalees, the majority of the population, in their political fight. The following finding is only an example picked up randomly from among many:

“Between May and December 1970 the Jama‘at campaigned frantically. Competition with the Awami League and clashes with Bhashani’s supporters escalated tensions in East Pakistan and Punjab, and clashes with the People’s Party tied down the Jama‘at in West Pakistan. […] Despite untiring efforts, it won only four of the 151 National Assembly seats which it contested, all in West Pakistan [now, Pakistan], and only four of the 331 provincial assembly seats it had aimed for, one in each province except Baluchistan […] It trailed far behind the Awami League and the People’s Party […] and to its dismay and embarrassment finished behind the Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Islam and Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Pakistan. The Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Islam even gained enough seats to serve as a partner to the National Awami Party […] in forming provincial governments in Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Province. To the Jama‘at’s surprise the two ulama parties did better than the Jama‘at, although they had contested fewer seats and received a lower percentage of votes cast. […] Where the Jama‘at had won only four seats (and none in East Pakistan), […] the ulama parties had won seven seats each. […] In contrast with the Jama‘at’s four provincial seats, the Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Islam had won nine and the Jami‘at-i Ulama-i Pakistan eleven. The Jama‘at’s 6.03 percent of the votes cast in National Assembly elections had yielded only 1.3 percent of the seats, and its 3.25 percent share of the vote in provincial elections a mere 0.67 percent of the seats. […T]he Islamic parties taken together did poorly in both parts of Pakistan. This limited the political power of Islam and further constricted the Jama‘at. […] The election results dealt a severe blow to the morale of Jama‘at members. Mawdudi’s leadership was questioned, as was the party’s time-honored reliance on Islamic symbols and the putative Islamic loyalties of Pakistanis. The election results, moreover, effectively eliminated the Jama‘at as a power broker.” (Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994, “7. The Secular State, 1958–1971”, The elections of 1970 and their aftermath) Almost similar pattern was experienced by other rightist political parties including Muslim League, the party that claimed spearheading the political moves for the establishment of Pakistan.

Moreover, the Pakistan state found the ideological and theoretical basis of its existence was lost in the political fight as Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr writes “[t]he inability of Islam to keep the two halves of the country united”. (ibid. “8. The Bhutto Years, 1971–1977”) The developments of contradictions, and deepening of failures led to further developments or complication of contradictions as Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr describes in the following way:

“Driven by its dedication to Pakistan’s unity and unable to counter the challenge of the Awami League, the Jama‘at abandoned its role as intermediary and formed an unholy alliance with the Pakistan army, which had been sent to Dhaka to crush the Bengali nationalists. After a meeting with General Tikka Khan, the head of the army in East Pakistan, in April 1971, Ghulam A‘zam, the amir of East Pakistan, gave full support to the army’s actions against ‘enemies of Islam.’ Meanwhile, a group of Jama‘at members went to Europe to explain Pakistan’s cause and defend what the army was doing in East Pakistan; another group was sent to the Arab world, where the Jama‘at drew upon its considerable influence to gain support. In September 1971 the alliance between the Jama‘at and the army was made official when four members of the Jama‘at-i Islami of East Pakistan joined the military government of the province. Both sides saw gains to be made from their alliance. The army would receive religious sanction for its increasingly brutal campaign, and the Jama‘at would gain prominence. Its position was, in good measure, the result of decisions made by the Jama‘at-i Islami of East Pakistan, then led by Ghulam A‘zam and Khurram Jah Murad. This branch of the Jama‘at, faced with annihilation, was thoroughly radicalized, and acted with increasing independence in doing the bidding of the military regime in Dhaka. The Lahore secretariat often merely approved the lead taken by the Jama‘at and the IJT [Islami Jami‘at-i Tulabah] in Dhaka. Nowhere was this development more evident than in the IJT’s contribution to the ill-fated al-Badr and al-Shams counterinsurgency operations.” (ibid. “7. The Secular State, 1958–1971”, The elections of 1970 and their aftermath)

The reality the neocolonial state was facing surfaced forcefully, and concerned quarters were looking at roots of the reality. Citing ‘Abdu’l-Ghani Faruqi’s “Hayat-i Javidan,” (HRZ, 31) Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr mentions one of those searches:

“Since the beginning of the East Pakistan crisis, Mawdudi had claimed that the problem before the country was the product of lackluster adherence to Islam. He in fact blamed the loss of East Pakistan on Yahya Khan’s womanizing and drinking. The IJT echoed Mawdudi’s sentiments: its answer to ‘What broke up the country?’ was ‘wine’ (sharab). Some in the army apparently agreed.” (op. cit., “8. The Bhutto Years, 1971–1977”)

On the basis of an interview with lawyer S. M. Zafar Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr cites another similar evidence:

“In 1972–1973, the military high command uncovered a conspiracy […] hatched by a group junior officers, led by Brigadier F. B. ‘Ali [….] S. M. Zafar, who defended the officers in court, recollects that they believed East Pakistan had been lost because of the government’s “un-Islamic” ways and Yahya Khan’s drinking in particular.” (ibid.)

Answers to the questions cropping up from the circumstances the neocolonial state faced, thus, are abounding. But don’t the answers also create further questions for further inquiry? As, for example, picking out a few from many questions: (1) Why institutions are not stronger than personalities? (2) Is it factual that the country generally does well under authoritarian rule and, if the claim is factual, what’s the reason? (3) Why the state failed to solve the question of nationhood? (4) Why the country was without a viable government, a constitution, etc.? (5) Why the state’s official status faced contradiction? (6) Why a state failed to resist a sharab addicted womanizer in usurping the helm of the state? (7) Is sharab more powerful than political process or when does sharab turns more powerful than political process? (8) Does a person or a group of persons determine fate of a state? (9) Is the state defensible if sharab turns more powerful than political process? (10) Are these the real questions? The questions turn more complicated if one looks at the political fight within and around the state machine that was going around since April 1971, the reactions among a part of its allies, and the genocide the state was carrying on. Positions of Z A Bhutto/Pakistan People’s Party, and its competitors during those days help find the reality of political jockeying that the state was experiencing. Statements of Z A Bhutto, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, Nawabjada Nasrullah Khan, Maulana Golam Gaus Hazarvi, Maulana Mufti Mahmud, Chowdhury Rahmate Elahi and other political leaders show their understanding of the situation and factional fight within the political system while the system was facing one of its most critical hours. The banning of all groups of National Awami Party and the cancellation of national awards of 32 high ranking civilian officers in 1971 are a few more evidences of the state’s vulnerabilities. There are more evidences. Even failure of a part of mainstream political leadership related to the state to foresee the coming events or the path of political developments or the destined path of the state is an important question, which haunts political scientists and politicians. The complications thicken if the scene is compared with other neocolonial states. The complication deepens if the reality or the questions are related to the Baangaalee people’s armed struggle for liberation and its victory. It was a people’s interaction/contradiction with a neocolonial state, and their way to carry forward the contradiction with the aim of liberation. Throughout the entire course of incidents/development the Baangaalee people appeared as the hero of history, which was blindly ignored by a part of the mainstream politics of those days although this principal character of history – the Baangaalee people – shaped political destiny of many. Actions by the people were impacting not only destiny of their land, but politics of other countries, Cold War days-super power relationships, etc. also. It was a unique moment in the life of the Bangladesh people. There were dynamics, equations, momentum, relations, speed and velocity. Hence, for furthering people’s political participation/activism, and for learning, the issue demands study.

Bangladesh Workers' Struggle Toward Liberation

Politics of people and politics of elites are opposed to each other as conflicting interests form their respective bases although elites, within dominating political structure, very often sway people. Aspirations of the two camps stand on respective interests, essentially class interests, which are also opposite. And, spirit emanates from aspiration.

People's interest and aspiration are simple: a better life; and for elites, interest and aspiration are narrow that can't get materialized without encroaching people's interest. Swaying commoners in favor of elites' interests are age-old trick. Weakness – ideological, political, organizational – within commoners' camp makes it happen.

Time negotiates zigzag – compromise – path to manifest and articulate people's interests, aspiration, spirit. For manifesting and articulating people's interests and aspiration, longer and shorter periods, obviously historic that sometimes appears gloomy, of struggle, victory and setback emerge and decline. Through struggles in places of production and between classes carried on everyday – struggle for survival – people learn, refine and articulate their aspiration. Their spirit keeps them alive, vibrant, struggling, and struggle educates them, widens their view, matures their perception.

Elite minds, a few or many, but not all, sections, but not all the sections, fail to read the writing on the horizon of time, a socioeconomic process, as commoners' aspiration and spirit develop and gain momentum gradually. Sometimes it develops silently. Interests and failure to adjust these interests keep these minds blind, an immature demo.

Affairs within Pakistan , the state that came out in mid-August of 1947, testify the immaturity of its ruling elites. Its obstinate immaturity either failed to see the gathering storm or felt confident with its heavy-looking thin power base relying on which it imagined: the socioeconomic process could be thwarted. The effective meaning of the imagination, a farce also, turned out: failure in perceiving the socioeconomic process.

Reading socioeconomic process is not an easy task as the process at times is obscure, and at times is bold; at times it moves at snail's pace, and at times it hits with lightning speed; at times its complex character appears simple. It's so difficult that persons with pro-people sentiment sometimes take anti-people position. Aspiration and spirit of commoners, the great masses of people, a bunch of “stupid” to elites, take shape, and these prevail, push many interests and push a lot, and these make many sell outs at times difficult and at times impossible. These also suffer setbacks. But the setbacks are for a period, for “now”, an intermediate stage in their forward movement.

Stream of incidents in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh , during the period 1947-1971 presents evidence of the pattern mentioned in the paragraphs above. Struggle of industrial workers in 1947-71 Bangladesh provides an example that helps identify the spirit of the industrial workers joining the Bangladesh War of Liberation.

Score

Industrial workers in East Pakistan were facing problems and hardship. The workers were trying to bring their problems to the notice of authorities/owners. But those were brushed off by the ruling elites/machine.

Reality the workers were facing is evident from the following incidents:

1. On October 15, 1947, cement industry workers in Chhaatak [also spelled Chatak] went on strike to realize their demands that included withdrawal of retrenchment order issued on a number of workers, increase in minimum wage, dearness allowance, introduction of monthly wage system instead of a daily-basis system, provident fund for all, paid weekly holiday, annual leave, provision for medical treatment and regular food ration, brick-built house for all, end to retrenchment. About four years later, on April 22, 1951, the same demands were raised at a conference of these workers. (Badruddin Umar, The Emergence of Bangladesh, Class struggle in East Pakistan, 1947-1958 , pp. 68-9)

2. Resolutions for increase in salary, introduction of grain shops and removal of corrupt officials were adopted at the 1 st annual conference of the Post and Telegraph Union held on March 6, 1949 in Dhaka . (ibid., p. 64)

3. On March 20, 1949, Azizul Islam, a trade union leader, said at the 1 st annual conference of the East Pakistan Railway Employees League held in Dhaka : Every citizen has a share in the wealth of a state; and level of luxury should be lessened. Ishaq, another TU leader, said: They are branded as communists whenever demands for food, shelter, etc. are raised. The disparity in the living standards between the 90 percent and 10 percent people in the country must be removed as early as possible. (ibid., p. 60)

4. On April 6, 1949, Abdul Hye, a TU leader, said in his address welcoming a minister: We hear assurances many times that the Pakistan administration would be run on the basis of the great Islamic ideals of equality, brotherhood and freedom. But the government of Pakistan , by ignoring these promises, is trying to crush the labor organizations by all possible means. (ibid., p. 62)

5. At the 2 nd annual conference of the East Pakistan Trade Union Federation, held in May 1-2, 1949, Amar Banarjee, a TU leader, made demand to nationalize essential industries and abolition of zamindari system. (ibid., p. 53)

6. Thousands of dock workers, bled white by war, famine and communal riots, sent an open letter to the labor minister and labor commissioner in August 1950. The letter detailed their miserable condition: No regular wage, no job security, no rights, no medical treatment facility and no compensation for injury although there were cases of injury, even of death in almost every night, no payment of wages for two full days work on August 12 and 13, 1949 although assurances were made to make payment of wages, nine-hour working day, etc. With a hope the letter, at the very beginning, mentioned that all the workers were Muslims. But the letter was ignored. (ibid., p. 72)

7. Nurul Huda, a TU leader, in his address at the 3 rd annual conference of the All Pakistan Postman and Lower Grade Staff Union held in Sylhet on September 12, 1950 said: It was the duty of the government to provide proper livelihood to the poor postal workers. Reactionary elements denounce all as communists and traitors whoever tries to inform people about the plight of the workers. (ibid., p. 64)

8. Workers of Adamjee Jute Mills decided to hold a meeting on December 25, 1952. The day was selected considering that December 25 was a public holiday as the birthday of Jinnah, considered father of Pakistan . On earlier occasions, the mills authorities kept the mills running whenever the workers decided to hold a meeting on Sundays. The workers thought that it would not be possible to resort to the tact as that was the birthday of Jinnah. But the mills were not kept shut. However, not a single worker joined the mills on the day. There was strike. (ibid., p. 238)

The date of the first case mentioned here is mid-October of 1947, two months after the new state was bundled by the departing British raj . Shall any mind turn indifferent to the problems/grievances the workers mentioned or do the complaints/demands sound illogical? But the state, Pakistan , was not making positive response. Its response was negative: Denial, suppression.

The trend – denial and suppression of workers' demands – prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s. Demands raised by the industrial workers throughout the period provide evidence. Sometimes the situation worsened as a whole or in an entire industry.

Denial

Grievances the industrial workers expressed or demands they made were mainly economic. Motive behind these demands was simple and humane: getting free from suffering, hunger, exploitation; a better life with health care facilities and housing; a fair share of the fruits of their labor; a space to articulate and share tales of suffering – a space for practicing democratic rights. These are bare minimum conditions for keeping human body of workers production-able, an essential requirement for capital also. But the immature capital and the state it operated denied this requirement.

Denial of these demands and suppression of workers made them aware of their rights of organization, assembly, expression. It was lessons from life: class struggle and struggle for production. “In spite of ... restrictions, working class militancy erupted in a number of long drawn out strikes. Between 1965 and 1968, 1.03 million man-days were lost in strikes. Of these, 587,000 man-days were lost in 1967 alone.” (Rehman Sobhan and Muzaffer Ahmad, Public Enterprise in an Intermediate Regime, p. 79)

Industrial workers gradually joined political movement in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh . Concepts of a society free from exploitation were gaining ground among the industrial workers. Decades of ideological-political work by progressive political forces contributed to this development among the industrial workers. Industrial workers gradually began raising political demands, and the demands were turning sharper, taking radical character. “In the three main movements against Ayub [a dictator with a non-martial law cloak] in 1962, 1964 and 1966, and in the election campaign of 1964, some elements of the working class were involved... [I]ndustrial workers faced the brunt of the repression in the streets when the government moved to use force against the movement.... It was not altogether surprising when the industrial workers for the first time came to the forefront of the political movement against the Ayub regime [...] in early 1969.... Their accumulated grievances against repressive labor laws and declining real wages began to find expression in a spate of strikes demanding higher wages and improvement of working conditions.” (ibid., pp. 80-1)

The 1965 Indo-Pak war, Tashkent Declaration on ceasing Indo-Pak military hostility, 6-point program for autonomy of East Pakistan and following political developments on the national stage influenced psyche of the masses including the industrial workers. The Mass Upsurge of 1969 and the tidal bore in 1970 made a change in the political spectrum and perception of commoners – industrial workers, peasantry and others closer to them. The '70-tidal bore took away hundreds of thousands of lives in the southern East Pakistan, and the people of East Pakistan, the Baangaalees, found the Pakistan rulers indifferent to the Baangaalee people. Even, not a single political leader came to see devastation wrought by the '70-sea surge and sympathize with the helpless Baangaalee people. Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani, the rebel Maulana, said in a mammoth Dhaka public meeting: Leaders from the western wing including Mia Mohammad Daulatana, Abdul Qayyum Khan, Nawabzada Nasrullah, and others have not come to see our suffering. A Dhaka Baanglaa daily headlined Maulana's utterance: Oraa keu aasenee , none of the political leaders from the western wing came to see our plight. The rift was visible.

And, the sense of deprivation, experience of suppression, aspiration for a better life in a democratic environment, spirit for struggle were articulated as cracks in the Pakistan state started surfacing. The industrial workers were imbued with a dream for a happier life as far left student activists turned labor organizers increased their political-organizational activities among the workers. One of the slogans popularized by left student activists was Tomaar aamaar mantra, samaajtantra , our mantra is socialism. It was dream for a society free from exploitation. Related publications also present similar facts.

“Working class consciousness and militancy inevitably grew with the size of the modern industrial labor force.... [I]nstead of merely abstaining from work, the workers occupied ... [enterprises] and confined the owners/managers within the premises until their demands were conceded. Gherao [the industrial action of occupying an enterprise] engulfed virtually every industrial centre and even spread to commercial enterprises and offices....Between 1968 and 1971 the number of unions in [ East Pakistan ] increased from 411 to 1174. At the same time man-days lost from strikes increased from 154,840 in 1968 to 366,901 in 1970.” (ibid., pp. 78, 81-3)

Verdict that the people of East Pakistan gave in the 1970 election was unequivocal: Get free from hunger, deprivation, repression; have a democratic life. Living condition of the industrial workers and political environment taking shape through conflicting interests were shaping the mass psyche. The industrial workers were no exception.

Sacrifice

“As early as of 1 st March [1971] the working class leaders and other student leaders gave the call for an independent Bangladesh [at] a mass rally of workers and students.” (ibid., p. 91) The spirit turned well-articulated: A life liberated from the clutches of hunger, exploitation, deprivation in an independent democratic country.

Masses of people started taking active role in political life. Faceless “idiots” appeared bright in processions, on the streets, in agitations. So, Bangladesh found many commoners turned courageous fighters. One of those many was, as Ittefaq , a leading Dhaka Baanglaa daily, reported, “Ayub Ali, 35, an employee in a cloth store and bears the burden of the helpless family of his dead father-in-law in addition to his mother, wife and daughter. He joined the procession defying curfew on the night, at 11p.m., of March 2, 1971. A bullet hit Ali's leg. That leg has been amputated. Now, he is a limbless man, and his future is a dark, uncertain. Yet, a light of happiness plays over his face, it's, probably, a happiness of sacrifice.” (March 16, 1971) The prevailing political environment and mass-mood was sharp with contradictions. On March 21, 1971, on the page of Holiday , the famous Dhaka English weekly, Enayetullah Khan, a leading editor in the country, portrayed: “[T]he city of Dhaka is ringing with the cry for national liberation....The slogans which rent the air with resounding echoes from all quarters demand absolute liberation.... [R]ural Bengal is preparing itself for a militant and protracted struggle under the leadership of the left radicals committed to a people's democratic order.” (“Regardless of constitutional footwork people's struggle continues”)

The war began. It was the masses of people, millions in number, joining the War of Liberation. Bangladesh was glowing with glory. And, the Pakistan ruling elite-“mind” full with incapacity to perceive the sociopolitical process, dumbness and stupidity to the brim, tried to stand against the tide of time. It was idiocy. But, history stood against the shrewd-looking idiotic Pakistan ruling elites only waiting to be denied by time and a war for liberation. It was a time with bravery of and sacrifices by the masses of people.

“As the [liberation] war intensified it was the students and workers, now joined in increasing number by the sons of peasants, who came in their thousands for training in the camps. It was they who suffered the privations of the training camps and then with rudimentary training and weapons went out to risk their lives against the Pak[istan] army.” (Sobhan and Ahmad, op. cit., p. 94) The spirit is not covered with confusion.

Many Baangaalees like Kootoob appeared on the stage of liberation. Kootoob, a boatman from a village in the southern district of Barisal, used to ferry the freedom fighters, informs Nirmal Sen, the revered journalist. One day his boat was attacked by the occupying Pakistan army while freedom fighters were on way to a guerrilla operation riding his boat. He lost his right arm as a bullet of the army shattered it. That arm was amputated. Now, Kootoob can't row boat, his path to livelihood. His family members are five with three daughters at the age of marriage. “I don't know the number of Kootoobs in the country.” (“ Mookteejooddha o akjan Kootoobuddin ”, “The war of liberation and Kootoobuddin”, Dainik Bangla , Dec. 15, 1991) A spirit for liberation led millions of Kootoobs, millions of peace-loving toiling masses, seemingly silent souls, to the war for liberation, a glorious act in lifetime, an act shaped through years of struggle.

The spirit is univocal: a dignified life, a happy life, a peaceful life. Through sufferings, struggles and lessons learned the working people contributed to manifesting the spirit that a nation upheld.

New Age , Dhaka , published the article in its Bangladesh Independence Day special issue on March 26, 2013.